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The new family: challenges to
American family law
Cynthia Grant Bowman*
The vast demographic and social changes of the twentieth century have produced a
variety of new family forms - cohabiting couples, same-sex couples, an increased
number of single-parent families, and extended families resulting from divorce, for
example. The legal system in the United States has yet adequately to address the legal
problems that these new family forms create. This article discusses a number of major
issues that arise from this failure, including: (1) the sometimes negative impact of
gender-neutral rules in divorce upon women and children; (2) the ambiguity and
inadequacy of property and support obligations between cohabitants; (3) the legal
incidents of non-residential conjugal relationships; (4) the incomplete revolution in the
status of gay and lesbian couples; (5) relationships in the post-divorce family, such as
those between stepparents and their stepchildren; and (6) the many conflict of laws
questions that arise from inconsistent treatment of these issues by different states.
INTRODUCTION

T

structure of families in Europe and North
changes
been
here havesince
America
ourvast
classic
family in
lawthe
rules were developed. Other commentators at
this workshop' have described some of the challenges to that law posed by new
reproductive techniques and by the amazing cultural diversity that has replaced what
was previously assumed to be homogeneity. Focusing on the United States, my
discussion will concentrate instead on the new family forms that have arisen as a result
of the great demographic and social changes that took place in the twentieth century.
During this period, women entered the paid labour market in large numbers for the first
time. The percentage of women in the labour force in the US was only 32.7% in 1948,
but 59.2% by 2009.2 The married family, as a result, now consists primarily of
dual-income couples, with all of the attendant problems for care work and the division
of household labour. Moreover, people are marrying later in life. The age of first
marriage rose in the US from 23 for men and 20 for women in 1966 to 27 for men and
25 for women by 2006.3 The divorce rate also rose dramatically in the course of the
twentieth century, until it reached what seems to be a more or less steady state
hovering around 50%.4

Dorothea S. Clarke, Professor of Law, Cornell University.
This paper was delivered at the Agenda-Setting Workshop on Family Regulation and Society funded by
the AHRC, ESRC, Nuffield Foundation and Family Law Bar Association, organised by the Universities of
Exeter, Bath, Bristol and Cardiff and held on 15-16 March 2010 at the Nuffield Foundation, London.
C. Jones, 'New Reproductive Technologies', and N. Bala, 'Responding to Cultural Diversity', papers
delivered at the Workshop.
2

Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, Employment status of the civilian noninstitutional
population 16 years and over by sex, 1973 to date, available at: http://www.bs.gov/cps/cpsaat2.pdf.
US Census Bureau, Estimated Median Age at First Marriage. By Sex: 1890 to the Present, Table MS-2
(2006).
US Census Bureau, Number Timing, and Duration of Marriages and Divorces: 2001 4 (2003).
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These changes have been accompanied by dramatic changes in family forms. There
has been a phenomenal increase in unmarried cohabitation, either instead of or prior
to marriage. In the US, the numbers of opposite-sex cohabiting couples rose from
500,000 in 1960 to 6.8 million (13.6 million individuals) by 2008, a very large social
change in a relatively brief period of time. 5 Single parenthood, whether as a result of
divorce or from simply never marrying, has increased apace, posing substantial
economic problems to the family unit.6 Over the second half of the twentieth century,
moreover, gay and lesbian relationships came out of the closet, and same-sex couples
began to demand recognition and equal treatment in all spheres, including the family
At the same time, the modern women's movement demanded and brought about major
transformations of the law governing the treatment of women both in the public sphere,
including the workplace, and in the family.
What we sometimes call the revolution in family law in the latter part of the twentieth
century was an attempt to deal with some of the issues presented by these changes.
The almost universal adoption of no-fault divorce was one major change, to which
other family law principles are still adapting. Other changes resulted from the women's
movement and were intended to promote gender equality by the elimination of
gender-specific laws. A variety of new institutions - domestic partnerships, civil
unions, and same-sex marriage - have been established to respond to the demands
of gay and lesbian couples.
The legal system in the US has had a hard time dealing with the new family forms
resulting from all of these changes. Major issues arising from the new family
relationships include: (1) the impact of gender-neutral rules in divorce law upon women
and children; (2) property and support obligations between cohabitants; (3) the legal
incidents of non-residential but conjugal relationships, sometimes called LATs ('living
apart together'); (4) the legal status of gay and lesbian couples; (5) relationships in a
new type of extended family, the post-divorce family, including the rights and
obligations attached to step-relationships of various kinds; and (6) the many conflict of
law issues that arise, both among states in the US and among nations in Europe, from
the establishment of domestic partnerships, civil unions, and same-sex marriages in
some areas and not in others. In this essay, I will discuss each of these areas of
challenge to traditional American family law but will spend the most space on the legal
treatment of cohabitation, the area upon which I have done the most research and
writing.
POST-SEX-EQUALITY FAMILY LAW AND THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY
The interaction between the movement for gender-neutral legal rules and the
almost-universal revolution from a fault-based to a no-fault system of divorce has
created its own set of problems. Liberal feminism, with its demand that women be
treated just like men, has led to the importation of gender-neutral rules into family law,
replacing previously gender-specific laws concerning post-marital support and child
custody, for example.7 One result has been, at least in the US, the near-disappearance
of any long-term spousal support after marriage and a rise in demands for custody by
PJ. Smock and W.D. Manning, 'Living Together Unmarried in the United States: Demographic
Perspectives and Implications for Family Policy' (2004) 26 Law and Policy 87, at p 88; US Census
Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2008 Annual Social and Economic Supplement, Table UC1.
* For example, 41% of all births in the US in 2008 were to unmarried mothers. See Pew Research Center,
The New Demography of American Motherhood (2010), at p 13, available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/
assets/pdf/754-new-demography-of-motherhood.pdf.
7
See, eg Orr v Orr, 440 US 268 (1977) (declaring alimony only for wives unconstitutional).
6
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fathers, even though the vast majority of children are still raised by their mothers after
divorce. The new gender-neutral laws are premised upon a presumption of equality
that does not in fact exist for many women." Women still make less than men on
average, work in sex-segregated jobs, and shoulder most of the caretaking work in our
society. But many courts ignore these continuing inequalities between women and men
in the workplace and the domestic division of labour and simply presume that women
are now men's equals. Thus judges may find that women no longer have any special
needs for protection after divorce, citing the existence of gender-neutral laws and
anti-discrimination statutes. For example, Justice Flaherty of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court upheld a premarital contract awarding no property and virtually no
support to a wife after a 9 year marriage because, he proclaimed:
'There is no longer validity in the implicit presumption that supplied the basis for
earlier decisions. Such decisions rested upon a belief that spouses are of
unequal status. Society has advanced, however, to the point where women are no
longer regarded as the "weaker" party in marriage, or in society generally
Paternalistic presumptions and protections that arose to shelter women from the
inferiorities and incapacities which they were perceived as having in earlier times
have, appropriately, been discarded.'9
For similar reasons, divorcing wives in the US are typically awarded only rehabilitative
alimony of a few years duration, during which they are expected to acquire job skills
and become self-sufficient, even after long-term marriages during which they did not
work for pay but instead contributed substantial labour to making a home and raising
the couple's children.
Some scholars have suggested drastic remedies for these problems. Martha
Fineman, for example, has suggested that marriage simply be abolished as a legal
category and that benefits be distributed instead to what she calls the 'mother/child
dyad', by which she means caretakers of either gender and dependent persons of any
age. 10 Less drastically, the American Law Institute has proposed new rules for the
distribution of property and support of ex-spouses upon divorce, under which separate
property would be re-characterised as marital property over time and after marriages of
a state-defined duration, spouses would receive compensatory payments for loss of
the marital living standard, graduated according to the number of years of marriage."
None of these suggestions has been adopted by any state.
POST-SEPARATION LEGAL REMEDIES FOR COHABITANTS
Next I turn to the legal rights and obligations of cohabitants who either cannot or do not
want to register as domestic partners, if that status is available to them where they live.
Many of these cohabiting couples are heterosexual, and sociologists have given us a
good deal of information about them. In the US, for example, the median duration of
cohabiting unions is about 1.5 years, with two thirds lasting less than 2 years (in the

8

See M. Fineman, The Illusion of Equalty: The Rhetoric and Reality of Divorce Reform (University of

9

Chicago Press, 1991).
Simeone v Simeone, 581 A2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990).

10

M.A. Fineman, The Neutered Mother The Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies
228-235 (Routledge, 1995).

" American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations §§
4.12, 5.04 (2002).
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UK, by contrast, the average duration is 6.5 years). 12 Four out of 10 cohabiting couples
in the US have children in the household; about half of them are the biological children
of both partners, and about half relate to one partner as they would to a step-parent. 13
The majority of cohabitants pool their incomes in some way, and they are no different
in this respect from married couples if they have a child.14 Cohabitation is particularly
common in the US among groups who are disadvantaged economically and
educationally and among racial and ethnic minorities, especially African Americans and
Puerto Ricans.15 Finally, cohabitants experience higher rates of domestic violence and
femicide than those who are married. 16
Some authors argue that unmarried cohabitation should be discouraged because of
its negative characteristics and that the law should accomplish this by denying legal
remedies of any sort to cohabitants.17 Even if it were possible to affect the rate of
cohabitation in this way, I reach an opposite conclusion. I conclude that cohabitants are
extremely vulnerable in many ways, especially when their relationships dissolve, a
vulnerability that seems to fall more on women than on men, and that for this reason,
the law should provide remedies to them.
Yet in virtually every state of the US, cohabitants have very few rights when their
relationships end unless they enter into an express contract that can be proved in
court, which very few do.18 If they have any property, which most do not, they can sue
to divide it based upon equitable principles of unjust enrichment or constructive trust,
but this typically requires the party seeking a share to be able to trace her contribution
to the acquisition of the property, usually a monetary contribution.19 So a woman who
paid for food and household necessities out of her income, or stayed home to raise the
couple's children, while her partner paid the mortgage, can end up without any legal
claim to the family home. 20 Moreover, cohabitants in the US have very few rights
against third parties or the state if their partners are injured or killed - workers'

L.L. Bumpass, 'What's Happening to the Family? Interactions Between Demographic and Institutional
Change' (1990) 27 Demography 483, at p 487; A. Barlow, 'Cohabitation Law Reform - Messages from
Research' (2006) 14 Feminist Legal Studies 167, at pp 172-173.
13 L.L. Bumpass et al, 'The Role of Cohabitation in Declining Rates of Marriage' (1991)
53 Journal of
Marriage and Family 913, at p 919; R.M. Kreider and J. Fields, Living Arrangements of Children: 2001
(US Census Bureau, 2001), at p 5 (Table 2).
4 K.R.
Heimdal and S.K. Houseknecht, 'Cohabiting and Married Couples' Income Organization:
Approaches in Sweden and the United States' (2003) 65 Journal of Marriage and Family 525, at p 533;
C. Vogler, 'Cohabiting Couples: Rethinking Money in the Household at the Beginning of the Twenty First
Century' (2005) 53 Sociological Review 1, at pp 12-13.
1
C.G. Bowman, Unmarried Couples, Law, and Public Policy (Oxford University Press, 2010), at
pp 111-117.
16
bid, at pp 151-158.
SW.C. Duncan, 'The Social Good of Marriage and Legal Responses to Non-Marital Cohabitation' (2003) 82
Oregon Law Review 1001, at p 1031; M. Gallagher, 'Rites, Rights, and Social Institutions: Why and How
Should the Law Support Marriage? (2004) 18 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 225, at
pp 238-240.
S C.G. Bowman, 'Legal Treatment of Cohabitation in the United States' (2004) 26 Law and Policy 120.
1 lbid, at pp 123-124.
20 The position of cohabitants in England is substantially similar, although they receive advantageous
treatment under many laws - concerning tenancies, pensions, workers compensation, and the Fatal
Accidents Act, for example - and certain rights upon inheritance. R. Probert, 'Cohabitation in Twentieth
Century England and Wales: Law and Policy' (2004) 26 Law and Policy 13, at pp 15, 17, 22-23;
A. Barlow, 'Regulation of Cohabitation, Changing Family Policies and Social Attitudes: A Discussion of
Britain Within Europe' (2004) 26 Law and Policy 57, at p 71.
12
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compensation benefits and unemployment insurance in California, 21 negligent infliction
of emotional distress claims in New Jersey,22 and loss of consortium actions in New
Mexico.23
American casebooks are full of examples of the injustices that result from the
absence of any legal remedies for cohabitants, especially women. Mr and Mrs Hewitt
of Illinois, for example, lived together as though they were married for 15 years,
beginning when they were students and continuing through his higher education, the
building of his professional business, and the accumulation of property and other
assets that would have been subject to equitable distribution if they had been formally
married. Mrs Hewitt cared for the couple's house, shopped and cooked, helped Mr
Hewitt in his business, both by entertaining clients and by working in his office, and
raised their children. When it came to 'divorce', however, she was left without any
property or support at all, including any equitable share in their home.24 A similar result
obtained in the well-known Marvin v Marvin case in California, despite the fact that the
California Supreme Court held in it that both express and implied contracts between
cohabitants were enforceable. 25 Moreover, if their relationships had not dissolved but
instead had lasted until the death of their partners, neither Mrs Hewitt nor Mrs Marvin
would have inherited any of their partners' property under the intestacy laws; and
neither would have been able to recover damages from a third party for his wrongful
death or workers' compensation or social security survivors' benefits from the state.
Among the common law nations, Canada has gone the farthest toward dealing with
the inequities that result from treating long-term cohabitants differently than married
couples. Cohabitants are entitled to all the rights of married couples under federal law,
including social security, if they have lived in a conjugal relationship for one year or
more. 26 They are entitled to post-relationship support in most provinces if they have
lived in a marriage-like relationship for a defined number of years.27 They are entitled
to property distribution in some provinces; and in other provinces, they can take
advantage of a somewhat more favourable law of constructive trust than the traditional
interpretation, one that rewards non-monetary contributions. 28 Moreover, cohabitants in
Canada receive many benefits as individuals, such as universal health insurance, that
are not generally available in the US from the government and are usually tied there to
marital and/or employment status.
To deal with these problems, I make a proposal for drastic legal reform in the US in
my book Unmarried Couples, Law, and Public Policy.29 After a period of time to be
defined by the state or a change in position based on the birth of a child, I propose that
the state should impose the rights and obligations of marriage upon cohabitants, while
respecting the autonomy of couples who do not want this result by allowing them to opt
1

22

2
24
25
26
21

28
29

See, eg State v Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 156 Cal Rptr 183 (Cal Ct App 1979); MacGregor v
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 689 R2d 453 (Cal 1984)(en banc).
Dunphy v Gregor, 642 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1980).
Lozoya v Sanchez, 66 P2d 948 (N.M. 2003).
Hewitt v Hewitt, 77 Ili.2d 49 (1979). Hewitt is still good law in Illinois.
Marvin v Marvin, 18 Cal 3d 660 (1976). But see Marvin v Marvin, 5 Family Law Reporter (BNA) 3079
(1979) (awarding nothing on remand).
Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, 2000 S.C., Chap. 12 (Can.).
See B. Hovius, 'Property Rights for Unmarried Cohabitants in Canada' [2006] International Family
Law 29.
lbid, at pp 29-34.
C.G. Bowman, Unmarried Couples, Law and Public Policy (Oxford University Press, 2010), at
pp 223-230.
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out by mutual agreement. The main argument against this proposal is that it constitutes
an unacceptable incursion upon the autonomy of individuals who have not chosen to
enter into marriage and thus should not be subjected to any obligations they have not
imposed upon themselves by contract.3o How do I respond to this objection? First, as
between the two parties, the same justifications for the imposition of obligations apply
as do for post-relationship support and property distribution on divorce-justifications
based on principles such as contribution, reliance, and reimbursement. Secondly, from
the viewpoint of the state, one of the fundamental purposes of family law is to protect
vulnerable parties when their relationships end. From what we know about the
characteristics of cohabiting couples - their economic interdependence, the presence
of children in their households, and other sources of vulnerability - there is reason to
believe that these couples may in fact need the protections of family law even more
than married couples do.
The conflict between autonomy and protection arises most keenly where one party
does not desire to undertake these mutual commitments and the other does. Whom
should the law favour in this conflict? My recommendation is to set the default position
in favour of imposing obligation but to allow opting out if both parties agree; this then
shifts the balance of power in intra-couple bargaining to the party desiring
commitment. This party is likely to be the woman. 31
THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF COUPLES WHO DO NOT LIVE TOGETHER
Another new family form is that of couples who do not live together. Studies show that
so-called living apart together is widespread. 32 Living apart together is virtually
unstudied in the US, but the phenomenon is quite common. Some preliminary studies
of who these people are and why they do not live together show that their reasons for
not doing so vary - they work or study in different cities, for example; they have
children or parents to look after; or they do not want to risk ruining their relationship by
too much togetherness. 33 These reasons can be subdivided into those resulting from
constraints (eg jobs in different cities, the necessity of caring for dependent family
members), in the absence of which the couple would cohabit, and other reasons that
would exist even in the absence of constraint (eg preferring to maintain their own
separate homes, friends, and independence even while living in the same city).
Do LATs fall into the category of a new family form to which traditional family law
should adapt? Scholars of the phenomenon differ in their responses to this question,
some seeing LAT as a dramatic new lifestyle, more individualised and freer than
traditional co-residential relationships, and perhaps prioritising friendship over sexual
coupling. 34 Other scholars emphasise the heterogeneity of LATs and the congruence
of their attitudes about family with those of the general population. 35 Until we know
3o

32

See, eg R.L. Deech, 'The Case Against Legal Recognition of Cohabitation' (1980) 29 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 480, at p 483.
See, eg R.R. Rindfuss and A. VandenHeuvel, 'Cohabitation: A Precursor to Marriage or an Alternative to
Being Single? (1990) 16 Population and Development Review 703, at p 711.
S. Duncan and M. Phillips, 'People Who Live Apart Together (LATs) - How Different Are They?' (2010) 58
SociologicalReview 112, at p 114.
Ibid. See also, J. Haskey and J. Lewis, 'Living-apart-together in Britain: Context and Meaning' (2006) 2
International Journal of Law in Context 37; S. Roseneil, 'On Not Living with a Partner: Unpicking
Coupledorn and Cohabitation' 11 Sociological Research Online available at: http://www. socresonline.
org.uk/1 1/3/roseneil.html.

Ibid.
3

S. Duncan and M. Phillips, 'People Who Live Apart Together (LATs) - How Different Are They?' (2010) 58
SociologicalReview 112, at p 114.
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more about this particular style of life, as we now do about cohabitation, however, it is
difficult to reach any definite conclusion about the appropriate legal treatment of it.
What is essential at this point is to carry out studies of the economic relationships
among these couples. Do they pool income? Do they share any expenses? Do they
share ownership of any property? To what extent are they economically
interdependent? By definition, of course, LATs have separate homes, which seems to
portend substantial economic independence, and they are unlikely to have children in
common. Both of these facts would tend to support treating them as separate
individuals rather than as a family unit under the law.
THE LEGAL STATUS OF GAY AND LESBIAN COUPLES
The new family form that has attracted the most attention in recent years is the
establishment of families by gay and lesbian couples and their recognition by the state
in some areas. A growing list of countries (Canada, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Norway,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Iceland, South Africa, and Argentina) now recognise
same-sex marriage, while other nations, like the UK, provide comparable benefits
through the establishment of some type of domestic partnership. The situation in the
US, where this issue has proved very controversial, is marked by immense diversity. By
2010, a small number of jurisdictions recognised same-sex marriage - Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Hampshire, Vermont, Iowa, and the District of Columbia; but the
benefits and obligations of marriage in those states extend only to those available
under state law, excluding the many federal law benefits of marriage, such as social
security 36 Other states allow same-sex couples to enter into civil unions or
partnerships that include all the benefits and obligations of marriage under state law,
and still others offer partnerships with some less comprehensive set of benefits. 37 The
situation is not only complex but also in flux.
Unlike countries where the law on this matter has been transformed by the passage
of legislation, the extension of rights to same-sex couples in the US has largely been
the product of litigation. Court cases have challenged the exclusion of same-sex
couples from marriage based on a variety of grounds under both the federal and state
constitutions, including deprivation of a fundamental right to marry under the Due
Process Clause and discrimination based on both sex and sexual orientation under the
Equal Protection Clause. 38 Some of these challenges have succeeded, although in
some states (New Jersey, for instance) civil unions or domestic partnerships have been
established instead of same-sex marriage. One interesting development over the last
decade has been that forces opposed to same-sex marriage have become increasingly
willing to accept domestic partnerships with all of the benefits of marriage as a
substitute for it.
In short, this is an unfinished revolution in the US. Because family law is a matter for
the states under the US Constitution, legal challenges to exclusion of same-sex
couples from marriage have proceeded on a state-by-state basis until now. In 2010,
however, a major federal court suit was tried in California, raising the question as one

3 As a result of ongoing litigation, California has shifted between same-sex marriage and domestic
partnership with all the benefits of marriage.
3 The following states offer domestic partnerships with rights comparable to those given married couples:
California, Nevada, the District of Columbia, Oregon, and Wisconsin. The following offer domestic
partnerships with more limited benefits: Colorado, Hawaii, Maryland, and Maine.
* See, eg Goodridge v Dept of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003); Varnum v Brien, 763 NW2d 862
(Iowa, 2009).
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of federal constitutional law.3 9 Under this law, the answer turns on a judgment whether
the state's interest in traditional marriage is substantial enough to merit continuing to
exclude same-sex couples from the institution in a state where they are already entitled
to all the state-law benefits of marriage as domestic partners. On 4 August 2010, the
federal district court in Northern California held that the restriction of marriage to
opposite-sex couples violated both the Due Process clause of the US Constitution specifically, the fundamental right to marry - and also constituted discrimination based
upon sexual orientation for which there was no legitimate state purpose, thus violating
the Equal Protection clause as well. 4 0
RELATIONSHIPS IN THE NEW EXTENDED FAMILY
The law has only begun to adjust to the many new family forms encompassed within
what may be called the new extended family Whereas the extended family of old was
comprised of blood relatives - grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, and the like - the
new extended family is created by the prevalence of divorce, cohabitation, and
assisted reproductive technology. An anecdote from my own life should suffice to
illustrate. When my stepson got married, the wedding pictures looked very different
from ones in the past. Attending him were four brothers - two half-brothers and two
step-brothers, all of whom had shared significant portions of his childhood. Arrayed
around him and his new wife in the photos were his mother and father, his father's third
wife, his previous step-mother and her new husband, his paternal grandfather, his
mother's ex-husband and that man's mother, and his then-stepmother's mother. Most of
these people had played important roles in raising him and had significant continuous
relationships with him. His paternal grandfather, at 80, was somewhat stressed by the
array, but my own grandfather probably would not have attended at all.
How, if at all, does or should the law address these relationships in the new
extended family? The law of divorce already handles issues between the child and his
two parents and between those two parents upon cessation of their marriage. That is
only a small number of the people in that wedding photo, though. Some states have
begun to recognise continuing relationships between children and their step-parents
upon divorce, including, in some instances, visitation and the payment of support.41 In
most states, in the absence of an agreement with their former spouse, step-parents
would be required to petition for any further contact with their stepchild under a statute
governing third party visitation, often styled on an original statute about visitation for
grandparents after the divorce or death of their own child. In any event, the court will
give substantial deference to the wishes of the child's biological parent whether to
grant or deny visitation. 42
The same situation can arise if a cohabiting couple separates. If one partner is not
biologically related to a child who lived in that cohabiting household, his or her rights
are tenuous. Thus, it is entirely possible that a person who has parented a child for a
significant period of time, perhaps even acting as the primary parent, may lose all
contact with the child; at best, they are likely to be reduced to very limited contact,
'
40

41

42

Perry v Schwarzenegger, No. 3:09-cv-02292 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
The decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in Perry v
Schwarzenegger is available at: https://ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/09cv2292/.
See D.R. Fine and M.A. Fine, 'Learning from the Social Sciences: A Model for Reformation of the Laws
Affecting Stepfamilies' (1992) 97 Dickinson Law Review 49; J. Carbone, 'The Legal Definition of
Parenthood: Uncertainty at the Core of Family Identity' (2005) 65 Louisiana Law Review 1295, at
pp 1311-1314.
Troxell v Granville, 530 US 57 (2000).
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especially if the biological parent has remarried. 43 In some, though not all of these
cases, the outcome will impose a substantial loss upon the child, the loss of a primary
parenting figure in his or her life.
The law has only just begun to address this issue in the US. Many of the first cases
involved lesbian mothers who separated from their partners after having jointly decided
to have and to raise a child together; only one of them, of course, can be the biological
mother. Pleading de facto parenthood, or parenthood by estoppel, or other equitable
theories, the non-biological mother sought visitation and/or custody; and in the earlier
cases, she usually lost, either based on lack of standing or under a best interest
standard. 44 Recent cases, however, have begun to reverse this trend, awarding
visitation and sometimes even custody to the non-biological mother.45 Not surprisingly,
the developing rules governing the relationship of lesbian mothers to their children
interact with those governing parentage in situations of gestational surrogacy and
other forms of assisted reproductive technology.46
In turn, cohabiting step-parents seeking visitation with their non-biological children
upon termination of a cohabiting relationship now borrow from the analysis used by the
courts in lesbian parent cases. The legal rule announced by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court has been particularly influential in this respect, holding that a cohabitant may
seek visitation if:
(1) the biological parent consented to formation of a parent-like relationship between
the cohabitant and his or her child;
(2) the cohabitant and child had lived in the same household;
(3) the cohabitant had taken significant responsibility, including financial support, for
the child's care and education; and
(4) the cohabitant was in the parent-like role long enough to have a bonded
relationship with the child of a parental nature.47
Under this or similar standards, some opposite-sex cohabitants have succeeded in
establishing standing to seek visitation with their previous partner's biological child,
and in one exceptional case even custody; but these cases are very rare.48 With the
dramatic increase in cohabitation, especially if it lasts for longer periods of time, these
issues will confront courts in increasing numbers in the future. The Wisconsin
standard, or some other like it,seems attractive, if one is concerned with protecting the
relationships of the large number of children raised in cohabiting households to adults
who play significant emotional and financial roles in their lives. The law needs to
explore, in this context and in that of assisted reproduction, why it is so wedded to the
idea that a child can only have two parents, and why the rights of multiple parents to
49
relationship with the child are based on a concept of all or nothing.

See, eg Temple v Meyer, 544 A2d 629 (Conn. 1988).
See, eg Alison D v Virginia M, 569 N.YS.2d 586 (1991).
4
See, eg Jones v Boring-Jones, 884 A2d 915 (Pa. 2005); Elisa B v Superior Court, 117 P2d 660 (Cal.
2005).
46 Ibid, citing Johnson v Calvert, 851 P2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (recognising parenthood by intent).
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PROBLEMS RAISED BY CONFLICTS OF LAWS
Finally, many thorny conflict of law issues arise between states and nations with
respect to the treatment of same-sex unions, domestic partnerships, and cohabitation.
As people enter these new relationships and then move to another jurisdiction, courts
are increasingly confronted with these conflicts. If a same-sex couple is married in
Iowa, for example, would they need a divorce to remarry in Illinois? How and where
would they obtain it if they are now resident in Illinois? If a same-sex couple registers
as civil partners in the UK, how will they be treated if they move to the US? These
questions are being resolved, incrementally, as individual cases arise or in some
instances by statute. Some American state courts - those of New York, for example have decided to recognise same-sex marriages entered in other jurisdictions even if
same-sex marriage is not legal within its own borders.50 Thus, a lesbian couple married
in Massachusetts could get a divorce in New York, with all of its attendant remedies for
property distribution, support, and custody of children, even though they could not
marry there. Most states, however, have proclaimed by statute, typically called a
Defense of Marriage Act that they will refuse to recognise same-sex marriages (and
sometimes refuse to recognise civil unions or domestic partnerships as well). These
conflicts create significant problems given the mobility of the American population.61
CONCLUSION
There are now so many family relationships our grandparents never dreamed of - the
couples we all recognise as couples but know are not married, the extended
post-divorce family portrayed in my stepson's wedding pictures, same-sex marriages
and domestic partnerships, and the relationships of children born of artificially assisted
reproductive techniques to their sperm or egg donors and surrogate mothers. The
family law of our grandparents' era is understandably ill-equipped to address the legal
issues that arise out of these new family forms. American law has begun to confront
many of these questions and to adapt, but slowly, to what is still an unfolding story. Our
legal concepts struggle at varying paces to keep up with the reality of family life today,
but if they fail to address the problems experienced by the families that exist today, and
cling to the ideals upon which traditional family law is premised, this failure will leave
many persons whom the law should protect in an exceedingly vulnerable position.
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